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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the effect of insurance coverage on medical 
expenditure in the United States. The data was gathered from the Household 
Component Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and is a cross-sectional data set 
with a sample size of approximately 1500 observations. The study also 
distinguishes between public and private insurance coverage to compare the 
potential moral hazard in the two separate markets. The results of this study 
suggest that insurance status, specifically public, has a strong positive effect on 
healthcare expenditure. This result, combined with a negative relationship 
between household income and healthcare expenditure, suggests that the 
source of financial funds rather than the ability to pay determines the demand for 
healthcare services. The study indicates that individuals are very sensitive to the 
financial incentives provided by public insurance and inefficiencies within the 
public insurance market should be examined by future research. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The healthcare system in the United States has long since abandoned a 
free market approach regarding the provision of services. Due to the critical 
nature of healthcare services, policies place emphasis on the provision of 
services to those less able to purchase health care. Since the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid the government has set price ceilings, such as the freeze 
on Medicare physician fees from 1984 to 1986, and heavily subsidized the 
provision of insurance to lower socioeconomic groups (Catlin & Cowan, 17). 
Government provision of insurance removes the financial incentive to 
make healthy lifestyle choices. Healthy lifestyle choices are potentially 
expensive, inconvenient, and time consuming for the individual (Jeon, et al.). 
However the research clearly suggests that avoiding health-risk behaviors 
eliminates excessive healthcare spending. Therefore, by shifting the economic 
burden of healthcare back to individuals the nation would potentially be able to 
reallocate wasted funds. 
When determining healthcare policy, the issue under consideration is most 
often related to meeting the needs of the people rather than a discussion 
regarding the supply and demand of the market. Health risk behaviors increase 
the demand for health expenditure overtime and are potentially avoidable 
(Cerimele & Katon). 
This study aims to examine inefficiencies within the healthcare system in 
the United States. Specifically the study aims to analyze the effect of moral 
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hazard on healthcare expenditure. Moral hazard potentially affects demand 
through the subsidization of healthcare. This study posses the research question, 
what effect does insurance coverage have on medical expenditure in the United 
States.  
As a secondary focus this study distinguishes between public and private 
insurance coverage to compare moral hazard between the two separate markets. 
The hypothesis for this study is that individuals with insurance will spend more 
than those without insurance due to a decrease in financial incentives. The 
second hypothesis is that individuals with public insurance will spend more than 
those with private due a less restrictive coverage environment in the public 
market. 
 
II. Literature Review  
 
Similar to other industries, substitutes for healthcare services exist. 
Substitutes that are currently available for the consumption of healthcare 
services include healthy lifestyle choices and activities that decrease stress in 
place of direct medical care. Since Medicare and Medicaid were introduced in 
1965, the use and intensity of personal healthcare services has consistently 
increased in the United States (Catlin & Cowan, 15).  
 The current body of research contradicts the concept that healthcare is a 
basic need and is unable to be controlled by behaviors outside of healthcare. For 
example, “a 10% relative drop in smoking in every state is predicted to be 
followed by an expected $63 billion reduction (in 2012 US dollars) in healthcare 
expenditure the next year” (Lightwood & Glance). The consumption of cigarettes 
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is an entirely preventable activity that contributes significantly to the healthcare 
expenditure of the United States.  
 Emergency medical visits and the utilization of potentially preventable 
provisions from medical providers are much more common in areas with 
increased economic deprivation. This could be due to the lack of prevention 
methods taken due to financial limitations (Davies et al.,1678). It is possible that 
economically deprived areas are less likely to provide healthy food sources, as 
highly processed, lower quality, goods are cheaper.  
The current body of research clearly suggests that lifestyle is a large 
indicator of the need for health services. In order to examine the demand for 
healthcare the variation in healthy habits across numerous socioeconomic 
communities must be examined. Factors that have been shown to contribute to 
healthcare expenditure, such as tobacco use (Xu et al.), inadequate nutrition, 
and obesity (Cerimele & Katon), are possible determinants leading to potentially 
avoidable healthcare expenditure.  
Previous studies suggest that individuals with lower socioeconomic status 
are less adaptive to changing health care beliefs. This could be due to a more 
constricted flow of information to the community. The negative correlation 
between socioeconomic status and the adoption speed of new theories regarding 
health could also be due to varying education levels. However, the current body 
of research suggests that marketing efforts are more successful among lower 
socioeconomic classes. The power of marketing has been researched 
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extensively and it is clear that healthcare centered advertising plays a large 
impact on the general opinion of the population (Suman et al., 7). 
The literature identifies a negative correlation between education levels 
and smoking rates in the population of the United States, as well as a negative 
correlation between income and the rate of smoking (“Current Cigarette…”). It is 
a possibility that individuals who smoke are also more susceptible to financial 
incentives, as they potentially possess less income. Additionally, the negative 
correlation identified between education levels and the rate of smoking by the 
CDC has certain implications when combined with the marketing trends identified 
by Suman et al. as previously noted. Individuals who participate in health risk 
behaviors may be the most susceptible to marketing efforts. This suggests that 
policy recommendations targeting the lower socioeconomic classes will be 
impactful due to the increased effect of marketing on the demographic and the 
increased participation in activities that lead to higher healthcare spending of the 
target population (Suman et al., 7). 
Increased government healthcare spending is also potentially harming the 
economy through an additional method. Government intervention is potentially 
constricting the market from moving towards supply side substitutes. A specific 
case provides evidence for this in India. India is currently experiencing a major 
shortage of qualified doctors, and has come up with alternatives to meet the 
large demand. Doctors only perform the most complex procedures and leave 
less skilled operations to employees who earn much lower wages. As a result, 
surgeries in India cost approximately 1/15th as much as they do in the US. India 
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has also decreased the cost of childbirth by implementing the services of 
midwives instead of doctors (Bangalore & Framingham, 102). 
 The lack of competition in the US market due to government intervention 
also potentially limits the incentive to increase the use of technology in the health 
sector (Bangalore & Framingham, 102). If the pressure of the free market was 
reintroduced it is possible that healthcare providers would decrease costs in the 
long term by implementing technology and utilizing less expensive employees in 
order to meet the demand for healthcare. The current situation regarding 
healthcare spending in the United States potentially allows government failure to 
occur. 
The 63$ billion that would be saved by a 10% decrease in cigarette 
smoking as mentioned previously could be put towards other means in the better 
interest of the nation (Lightwood & Glance). Smoking is a specific health risk 
activity committed by of 15% of the American population and is causing 
economic inefficiencies (“Current Cigarette…”). A counter argument regards the 
inelasticity of cigarettes. Theory suggests that while a decrease in smoking would 
lead to less healthcare spending, it is unrealistic to assume that smoking can or 
will decrease due the intense commitment of smokers. However, cigarette 
consumption among the American population decreased from 20% to 15% 
during the time period of 2005 to 2015. This statistic suggests that while the 
decrease has been slow, cigarette consumption is not perfectly inelastic 
(“Current Cigarette… ”). These results can be applied to other health risk 
behaviors, such as obesity.  
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The current research provides overwhelming evidence to support the 
theory that moral hazard is a significant burden to the economy of developing 
countries. However, less evidence can be found regarding developed nations 
and the United States specifically (Yawson et al.). In 2003 Ghana implemented a 
national health insurance plan to promote access to healthcare throughout the 
country. Studies examined the utilization of healthcare services between the 
insured and uninsured populations and found significant differences in healthcare 
service utilization between the two demographics. Insured costumers were found 
to use the available services much more often than those uninsured and the 
study provides significant support for the theory of moral hazard regarding 
healthcare (Yawson et al.). 
It is not only consumer moral hazard that needs to be considered. 
Additionally in Ghana, studies recognized that multiple costumers with the same 
ailment were given different treatments due to their insurance status (Yawson et 
al.). Over diagnosis has been recognized as an issue in Ghana, as well as 
Uganda, specifically with Malaria patients (Ghai et al.). Less research has 
examined the prevalence of over-diagnosis in the United States.  
The lack of available literature regarding supply side moral hazard in the 
United States raises questions. Corruptions within certain subsets of the 
healthcare industry have been identified, specifically regarding the 
pharmaceutical industry. Many cases suggesting corruption have occurred 
involving drug companies, all of which are public knowledge. Drug companies 
have paid large settlements in the wake of accusations regarding illegal 
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marketing attempts (Berns, 560). While surprisingly less research is present 
regarding over-diagnosis and corruption in the US regarding overall health, the 
body of literature is present to suggest that prescription drugs are over-
prescribed (Berns, 558). 
 The pharmaceutical industry is directly related to health expenditure. From 
2000 to 2002 physicians and clinical services increased 7.8% on average 
annually, driven by a “rapid increase in retail prescription drug expenditures” 
(Catlin & Cowan, 21). During the period, multiple new blockbuster drugs were 
introduced and the intensity of marketing efforts from the pharmaceutical industry 
increased dramatically. 
  The Affordable Care Act provided an estimated $100 billion in revenue to 
drug companies, who also rank first in lobbyist spending among all industries at 
$234 million in 2012. The health sector also ranked first among sectors at $486 
million in 2012. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the health sector spent 
more on lobbying in 2009 than in 2012, 2009 being the year ‘Obamacare’ was 
formulated (Fields, 559).  
A possible solution to consumer moral hazard, utilized in other insurance 
markets, is to provide incentives for behaviors that are correlated with the 
decreased risk of loss to the insurance company (Stewart, 194). For example, 
auto insurance companies provide ‘safe driver discounts’ and other incentives 
that encourage the individual to follow traffic laws that are in place to decrease 
the risk of harm to body and property. In this way, auto insurance companies 
reduce the risk of moral hazard. If companies granted full coverage to drivers 
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without considering risk, less incentives would exist for individuals to drive slower 
and pay more attention to safety signs and policies (Stewart, 193).  
Government provided insurance essentially removes the incentives to live 
more carefully. Lifestyle choices that have been suggested to cause increased 
spending, such as a high BMI or consistent smoking, could potentially be 
incentivized against to the betterment of the American economy. In the pursuit of 
equity many policy makers attempt to make healthcare available to those who 
cannot afford it. It is possible, that through the pursuit of equity, individuals are 
indirectly being financially encouraged to continue to partake in health risk 
behaviors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Theoretical Model 
 
Model 1 (Full Model) 
 
Expenditure   =   β0 +  β1 Insured +  β2 Race +  β3 RegionNE +  β4 RegionMW +  β5 Sex +  
β6 Married +  β7 Age +  β8 Exercise +  β9 BMI +  β10 Smoking +  β11 Income +  ε  
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Y1= Individual Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015) 
 
Independent Variables:  
 X1 = Insured 
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 X2 = Race (White) 
 X3 = Region (Northeast) 
 X4 = Region (Midwest) 
 X5 = Sex (Male) 
 X6 = Marriage Status (Married) 
 X7 = Age 
 X8 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week) 
 X9 = Body Mass Index 
 X10 = Currently Smoking 
 X11 = Annual Income 
 
 The model utilizes Annual Health Care Expenditure of each Individual as 
the dependent variable. This figure was gathered by combining the healthcare 
expenditure of each individual from both years of the survey, 2014 and 2015, and 
deriving the average annual expenditure. In order to examine the theory of moral 
hazard regarding the healthcare market, the independent variable in question is 
the insurance status of the individual, those insured compared to those not 
insured. The theory under examination aims to discover whether insurance 
coverage removes the incentive to live a healthy lifestyle. Early statistical models 
did not include as many factors as the full model above, however due to the 
model’s low explanatory power the data set was examined to include more 
indicators of healthcare expenditure.  
Many factors were included in order to account for demographic 
differences. Race was separated into ‘White’ and ‘Non White’. Regional 
differences were also accounted for. There are many possibilities for the cause of 
spending variation between regions. Some possibilities include the varying costs 
of services as well as varying standard lifestyle. The two regions included in the 
data set were each selected due to their respective number of urban centers. 
Research suggests that the number of urban centers per mile is negatively 
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correlated with obesity. The expected coefficient for the northeast region is 
negative, as this part of the nation has the highest number of urban centers. The 
midwest region is expected to have a positive relationship as it has the lowest 
number of urban centers. 
Sex was included in the model and measured as male or not. The 
expected coefficient was negative, as older women tend to experience health 
issues with more intensity than men (Yong et al.). The study hypothesized that 
men would exhibit lower levels of spending across the board. 
Marital Status is included as the body of literature suggests a strong 
correlation between BMI and the marital status of an individual (Khan et al.). The 
expected coefficient is positive suggesting that individuals who are married will 
have higher levels of healthcare expenditure. 
 The current body of literature has illuminated a relationship between 
obesity, smoking, and education levels (Cerimele & Katon). Due to this 
relationship, current smoking status was included as an independent variable. 
The expected effect of smoking status is a positive relationship, suggesting an 
individual who smokes is likely to have higher total expenditure.  
Age was not originally included in the model but was ultimately added to 
help distinguish between public healthcare insurance coverage. The final aspect 
of the study examines the difference between insurance type rather than 
insurance status. Including age allows for the difference to be exclusively due to 
the different type of insurance rather than older individuals simply needing more 
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coverage, specifically with the provision of Medicare. The expected coefficient for 
age is positive. 
Exercise and Body Mass Index were included to account for expenditure 
due to lifestyle choices on behalf of the individual. Obesity creates demand for 
potentially avoidable medical services. The expected coefficient for exercise is 
negative suggesting that individuals who participate in regular exercise will 
decrease their demand for medical services. The expected coefficient for BMI is 
positive suggesting that individuals with a higher BMI will have a need for more 
medical services and ultimately have more healthcare expenditure. 
Annual income is included in the model to account for the ability to pay for 
services. The expected coefficient is positive suggesting that as individuals have 
more income they will be more willing to spend money on healthcare services as 
the opportunity cost of alternatives will decrease. 
 The error term encapsulates all variation within the model not explained by 
the identified independent variables. After a final model has been determined the 
study will examine the effects of public verse private insurance on healthcare 
expenditure. The expected coefficient is a positive relationship between public 
insurance and expenditure. Private insurance includes more limitations and 
regulations, creating a deterrent for those intending to spend. This model 
provides a distinction between separate types of coverage to examine moral 
hazard in different financial markets, public and private.  
 
IV. Empirical Model 
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In order to help smooth the data the average of spending for the individual 
was taken from 2014 and 2015 in order to account for any irregularities. 
Specifically this helps account for accidents that are less related to health 
lifestyle and overall health. All factors in the full model were statistically 
significant at the 95% level. However, many variables accounted for little 
variation in the dependent variable. Model 2 attempted to minimize the number of 
factors in order to produce more economically significant results. In order to 
transition from the first to the second model many variables were eliminated.  
Model 2 
 
Expenditure= β0 +  β1 Insured +  β2 Race +  β3 Age +  β4 Exercise +  β5 Income + ε  
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Y1= Average Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015) 
Independent Variables:  
 X1 =Insured 
 X2 = Race 
 X3 = Age 
 X4 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week) 
 X5 = Income 
 
The second model included the key variable of insurance status. Race 
and age were also included as they were the most significant determinants of 
demographic differences. Exercise was included to account for lifestyle. Income 
was included to account for the ability of the individual to pay for healthcare 
services independently. 
BMI and exercise were both included in the full model in an attempt to capture 
the effect of activity and nutrition. Exercise was chosen to represent lifestyle in 
model 2, as the t-value was more significant than that of BMI. It can be 
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ascertained that those who are health conscious enough to exercise five times a 
week also make healthy choices in other areas of their lives. Due to this 
relationship it is acceptable to remove BMI and suggest that the model still 
accounts for health behavior. 
 Smoking, while statistically significant, was eliminated from the final model. 
Smoking most likely will have an impact on the expenditure of the individual all at 
one time. An individual could smoke for a long time without actually incurring 
costs. Smoking is shown to greatly affect total national expenditure on larger 
nationwide studies and can also be implied to increase the expenditure of the 
individual over the course of their life. However a two-year time period is likely 
not a long enough time span to accurately evaluate the incurring costs of 
smoking. It is also possible that an individual may have only begun to smoke, in 
which case the incurring costs are potentially a long way in the future. 
Overall, in decreasing from 12 to 5 variables the R-squared statistic dropped 
by .5% suggesting that originally too many factors were included. However this 
was done in an attempt to explain as much of the variation as possible as early 
regressions struggled to produce significant R-squared statistics. In an attempt to 
increase the explanatory power of the full model the data set was re-examined 
and additional independent variables were added.  
.  
Model 3 kept all of the factors of Model 2, except for the key variable of 
insurance coverage. In order to assess Model 3 the population was slightly 
altered. Model 3 utilized the population of individuals who had insurance only, 
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and examined the differences in spending among those with public and private 
insurance. The first variable in Model 3 is public insurance status.  
 
Model 3 
 
Expenditure= β0 +  β1 Publically Insured +   β2 Race +  β3 Age +  β4 Exercise +  β5 
Income +  ε  
 
Dependent Variable: 
Y1= Average Annual Health Care Expenditure (2014-2015) 
Independent Variables:  
X1 = Publically Insured 
X2 = Race 
X3 = Age 
X4 = Exercise (Participates in rigorous exercise 5 times a week) 
X5 =Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Data Sources and Description  
 
Many different data sets were examined throughout the study in order to 
derive statically significant results. In order to establish statistical significance a 
high-powered test was needed. Due the variation within the dependent variable, 
and the dependence on the variation of a large number of factors, a large sample 
size was required. Ideally a longitude survey would be conducted to evaluate the 
intensity of services utilized pre and post implementation of insurance. The data 
needed to be applicable inside the United States as the study intended to 
examine the effects nationally. Results within dependent nations have been 
examined in the past and moral hazard specifically in the U.S. was the focus of 
the study. 
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The first data set examined United States expenditure over time. The first 
year encompassing accurate data for the relevant variables identified in the 
literature was 1991, and the data was then examined from 1991 until 2016. 
However the sample size was unable to produce statistically significant results. 
The second data set was a cross-sectional look at all 50 states in 2016.  The 
sample size of the data was also an issue with the second data set. 
The third and final data set which was ultimately utilized for the purpose of 
the study was gathered from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The specific 
survey used was the most recent Household Component Survey, which analyzed 
approximately 15,000 households over a two year time period from 2014 to 2015. 
This survey was gathered nationally and provides the most accurate 
representation of health and healthcare services across the entire United States. 
The survey includes 5 rounds of interviews across 2 full calendar years. 
Computer assisted personal interviewing is utilized to gather information between 
interviews. Household statistics are reported by a single household respondent 
(“MEPS”). 
 The original 15,000 entries were edited down to 9,000 entries for which 
responses in regards to all relevant variables were accounted for. In addition the 
final sample was limited to adults ages 17 and older. In cleaning the data all 
individuals with incomplete answers, inapplicable answers, or anyone who chose 
not to respond to a question needed to be removed. The elimination of data 
created response bias. It is unclear why an individual would refrain from 
answering for certain categories.  
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VI. Econometric Analysis 
Model 2 produced an R squared of .073 suggesting that the model 
accounts for 7.3% of the variation in total healthcare expenditure. The model 
included 9,197 observations and had an F statistic of 143.81. All independent 
variables are significant at the 99.9% confidence level. 
Race had a positive relationship with expenditure, as individuals 
identifying as “White” were predicted to spend $2031 more on healthcare 
annually holding all else constant. This result aligns with the expected 
relationship at the outset of the study. Age also has a positive relationship with 
expenditure, as each yearly increase in age was suggested to lead to a $141 
increase in annual healthcare expenditure holding all else constant. This result 
aligns with the expected coefficient sign for age. 
Exercise had a negative relationship with expenditure. This finding 
suggests that lifestyle plays a large part in determining healthcare spending. 
Individuals who exercise at least five times a week are expected to spend $2338 
less on healthcare per year holding all else constant. 
According to the model, individuals who have health insurance are 
predicted to spend $2715 more on healthcare annually holding all else constant. 
This result provides significant evidence for the case of moral hazard regarding 
the healthcare insurance market. 
The one factor that did not show the expected relationship was income. 
Income was negatively correlated with total expenditure. The coefficient suggests 
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that for every a decrease of $10 in expenditure is expected to result from every 
$1000 increase in income. This suggests that ability to pay plays much less of a 
role in determining healthcare expenditure than the source of the funds. One 
possible explanation for relationship is the negative correlation between income 
and obesity identified by the literature. 
The constant is -2325 suggesting that an individual not deriving a value 
from any independent variable would have negative healthcare spending. This 
constant is difficult to interpret. Specifically the variable of age presents an issue, 
as all subjects in the study were at least 17 years old. The predicted spending in 
the case of the constant would only be the case if the individual was zero years 
of age and received no income. 
 
Results: Model 2 
 
 
 
P values: *** = <.001 ** = .001 - .01 * = .01 - .05 
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The third model included the factors of race, age, exercise, and income, 
but slightly altered the key variable. Rather than examining the insured verse 
uninsured populations, the third model only looked at the insured population and 
examined differences between the types of insurance. The coefficients for each 
independent variable remained within 20% of the value respectively presented in 
model 2 throughout the transition. 
The third model accounts for 7.4% of the variation within the dependent 
model with an R-squared of .074 and an F statistic of 112.73. All variables are 
statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. 
The independent variable for type of insurance, ‘public,’ has a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable and a coefficient of 2544. The 
relationship is consistent with expectations and the coefficient suggests that 
individuals with public insurance will spend $2544 more on healthcare services 
annually holding all else constant.  
 
Results: Model 3 
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VII. Econometric Problems 
 
 No multicollinearity exists within the model. All VIFs are under 1.2. 
Additionally no independent variable is correlated with another by more than 
25%. There is no contradiction with the F probability. Autocorrelation does not 
relate to the cross-sectional data set.  
One issue with the results is the presence of heteroscedasticity. Model 2 
produces a chi squared statistic of 1480.52 significant at the 99.9% level. 
Similarities most likely exist between groups within the insured, race, exercise 
and income variables, skewing the variance between standard errors. Further 
studies should examine better linear nonbiased estimates that have a lower 
sampling variance in order to get closer to the true population parameter. 
 The model most likely suffers from omitted variable bias. When predicting 
health care expenditure there are many relevant factors that come into play. 
Omitted variable bias is most likely the cause for the presence heteroscedasticity 
in the model. To correct this issue, more variables were added to the full model. 
However, attempts to increase explanatory power were unsuccessful. 
 
VIII. Discussion: Limitations and Implications 
The fit of the final model is lower than ideal with an R-squared statistic of 
.074. The model leaves a large amount of variance to be explained. Due to the 
P values: *** = <.001 ** = .001 - .01 * = .01 - .05 
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nature of the dependent variable this stands to reason, as many factors 
contribute to the variation that are difficult to account for. The market for products 
and services significantly contributes to nominal outcomes of healthcare 
spending. The cost of services is determined by supply and demand and this 
study mainly focused on determining the quantity of services. Future studies 
should isolate spending on specific illnesses and procedures that are common, 
such as joint pain or heart disease, in order to control for market variations. 
The cost of technology, the quantity of investment, and the marketing efforts 
of providers all play a role in the market. Accidents also play a large part in 
determining the demand for healthcare services on behalf of the individual. 
Genetics are an additional factor contributing to health status, especially later in 
life. Future studies should examine family medical history as a predictor of 
health. 
An additional limitation of the study was due to the data available. The study 
uses cross-sectional data and does not account for the total expenditure of the 
individual over time. However with such a large sample size, the study should 
come close to compensating for this as it encompasses individuals across all 
areas of life. The sample includes those who are paying large and small amounts 
for healthcare compared to their lifetime average. 
The results are not enough to suggest causality. This is a limitation of the 
data. The study identifies a correlation. However, in order to suggest causation 
the test would have to include panel data over a long enough period of time to 
account for the variation in health expenditure pre and post instigation of 
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insurance coverage. The dependent variable needs this time to avoid error as the 
behavior and situations of individuals may not lead to a change in healthcare 
spending in the short term, and the time span must be long enough to account 
for major changes down the road. Additionally the test would have to essentially 
provide insurance to those who did not have it before and see how spending 
habits were altered holding everything else constant. Or in the case of the third 
model, an individual with private insurance would have to be given public 
insurance and then monitored over to time to account for spending habits that 
were related purely to the different type of coverage. 
However, the coefficients have significant economic implications. The 
coefficients suggest that between the two groups there are large differences in 
spending. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that insurance coverage 
and public insurance coverage cause the individual to utilize health services 
more frequently, holding all else constant. 
 While significant evidence exists in previous studies to suggest that 
individuals increase expenditure under insurance coverage, this study 
contributes to the current body of literature through the results of the third model 
(Stewart). The finding that the coefficient and difference between the public and 
privately insured groups mirror the affect of those with insurance and those 
without is a significant addition to the current body of research. Studies have 
identified the positive relationship between spending and insurance coverage 
mainly in developing nations, and this study also contributes to the research 
regarding developed markets. (Yawson, et al.). The results have extreme 
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economical implications. If private insurance is capable of providing the coverage 
for required care, inefficiencies within the public insurance market need to be 
identified.  
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
The study clearly suggests that individuals with healthcare insurance spend 
more on healthcare than those without. However, this positive relationship is not 
necessarily disadvantageous to the economy. Income was negatively correlated 
with spending, suggesting that personal income is not spent on healthcare if 
possible. In essence, providing public healthcare is subsidizing healthcare. 
Insurance status, specifically public, has a strong positive effect on 
healthcare expenditure. However income had a negative relationship with the 
dependent variable. This suggests that the ability to pay does not affect 
expenditure, but rather the source of the funds determines willingness and 
demand. Services are purchased with insurance that the individual without 
insurance would not require or value enough to attain. 
If a healthier population is more productive, than the presence of moral 
hazard suggested in this study may actually have a positive outcome in a general 
equilibrium. The health of the population is a significant indicator of overall 
wellness and should be invested in as long as the services rendered are 
beneficial. Incentivizing the population to seek out healthcare when it is 
necessary for health is advantageous to the American economy. 
The level of benefit provided determines the value of healthcare services. 
However, further studies should examine supplier side moral hazard. Over-
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diagnosis and over-prescription have been identified in developing countries and 
should be examined in the U.S. market. Another potential issue is the 
deadweight loss from leaving the free market system. In order to reconcile for the 
subsidization provided by public healthcare, price ceilings should be 
implemented to prevent excessive price increases within the market. The freeze 
on Medicare physician fees from 1984 to 1986 is an excellent example of 
increased regulation that should be considered in the future to help eliminate the 
potential for supplier moral hazard. 
Due to the limitations of the data, the results of this study do not 
necessarily confirm the theory of moral hazard as it pertains to health risk 
behaviors. Total expenditure is the product of market forces, social attitude, and 
accidents. The study required a high-powered test to observe statistical 
significance within the model. The study found that such large sample sizes do 
not exist in longitudinal data sets for all of the relevant variables. Health risk 
behaviors need to be examined over long periods of time in order to evaluate 
how the lack of financial consequences in the healthcare market affects the 
lifestyle choices of the individual. 
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Regression Results: Model 1 (Full Model) 
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Inter-Correlation Matrix: Model 1 
 
Regress Results: Model 2  
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Inter-Correlation Matrix: Model 2  
 
 
Regression Results: Model 3 (Type of Insurance) 
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Inter-Correlation Matrix: Model 3 (Type of Insurance) 
 
 
Breush - Pagan Test: Model 2 
 
 
